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UNSCRAMBLING THE SCRAMBLE:
AFRICA'S PARTITION RECONSIDERED •
Studies of the Scramble for Africa agree on very little beyond the
fact that the topic is immensely broad and extremely complex. For all that
the last decades of the 19th century have been the most closely examined
period of Africa's past, there is agreement neither about what is meant
by imperialism generally, nor about the causes of Africa's partition
specifically. 'The growth of knowledge1, Peter Cain and Tony Hopkins have
commented, 'has brought less, and not more, coherence to historical
understanding'.1 Indeed, the apparently intractable nature of the process
of Partition is underscored in numerous warnings to the unwary to stay clear.
Some ten years ago, Bernard Porter darkly observed that the whole question
was 'bedevilled with misunderstandings and confusions and crosspurposes'.
'An always somewhat treacherous field1, he wrote, has been 'churned into
a quagmire1.2 Nor are more recent conclusions any more sangine. Although
'specific points of agreement will undoubtedly appear - such as the
inapplicability of the Hobsonian model, or the economic bases for annexation
in West Africa1, it is unrealistic, according to James Sturgis, 'to expect that
any overall consensus regarding the new imperialism will ever prove
acceptable'.^
Yet however sensible and timely such warnings, they do little to assuage
an equally widespread feeling that the retreat from generalisation has turned
into a rout. To take only a few examples, Andrew Porter for one has remarked
that the 'gathering of more knowledge from particular and local studies
often does comparatively little to advance general understanding1,4 while
Barrie Ratcliffe for another, has pointed to the growing danger that 'area
and case studies will replace ... analysis of the Partition as a whole, and
that concern with complexity will win out over the need to explain. It cannot
suffice to claim that the Partition was but the consequence of the convergence
of many different chains of events'.5 'It is surely not unreasonable1, Robin
Law has argued, 'to expect that the enormous volume of scholarly work
on the historical problem of European imperialism which has appeared during
the last two decades, should have led to the refinement of theoretical models
as well as to the accumulation of detailed facts, to greater understanding
rather than to despair at the complexity and difficulty of it all'.6
While readily acknowledging the impossibility of reaching any consensus
which would satisfy even the majority of scholars in such a bitterly contested
field, this paper nonetheless attempts to meet the 'reasonable expectations'
of at least some of them. It does so by immediately distinguishing between
the territorial expansion of empire ('colonialism'), ancl imperialism (the
monopoly stage of capitalism),7 after which it proceeds, very briefly, to
outline the main historiographical developments in the study of Africa's
Partition over the last 30 years or so, before suggesting, at greater length,
how an alternative explanation might be constructed. Two disclaimers are
necessary at this stage, though. An attempted synthesis of this kind rests
very largely on the labours of other scholars. Just how much this paper
owes to a great many historians will become obvious as it progresses, but
specific mention should be made of its indebtedness to seminal contributions
by Peter Cain and Tony Hopkins, Shula Marks, Forbes Munro, Colin Newbury,
and Stanley Trapido.° At the same time, it relies heavily on Geoffrey Kay's
endlessly stimulating analysis of the various forms assumed by capital at
different times and places in what became the Third World.^ The second
disclaimer follows from this. Although this paper quite explicitly employs
one particular set of theoretical tools to uncover the historical process of
Africa's Partition, their use does not imply that a conceptual straight-jacket
is thereby wrapped around the past. There clearly is a danger, as one reviewer
reminds us, that
in the search to impose structure and order on the
material, Ischolars frequently lose sightl ... of what
an incoherent and multi- face ted phenomenon European
imperialism was; of how divided and confused, sometimes
even powerless, metropolitan governments could be;
landl of how important the reaction of native societies
was in explaining the course and nature of expansion,10
but even when allowance is made for all of this, the point surely still remains that
theories are best treated 'less as oversimplifications to be exposed, ... than
as devices for introducing order and intelligibility into data whose multiplicity
and complexity make them otherwise incomprehensible1.11
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Since 1961 the historiography of Africa's Partition has been dominated
by Robinson and r.ailagher's Africa and the Victorians, subsequently elaborated
in a chapter on the Scramble in the New Cambridge Modern History.12 The
arguments of this watershed work hardly require extended rehearsal. Suffice
it to say that Africa was partitioned not for reasons emanating from the
centre, but for reasons arising in Africa itself. 'Scanning Europe for the
causes, the theorists of imperialism have been looking for the answers in
the wrong places. The crucial changes that set all working took place in
Africa itself'.13 More specifically, political crises in Egypt and South Africa
obliged Britain to intervene to restore law and order, thereby ensuring the
safety of the sea route to India. 'Both the British occupation of Egypt and
the subsequent decision to annex territory on the east coast of Africa at
the expense of claims on the west stemmed from the imperative of the
strategic need to safeguard the route to India. In the main, British Africa
was a gigantic footnote to the Indian empire1.14 Whitehall's interventions,
so Robinson and Gallagher assert, upset the existing diplomatic balance
of power between Britain and France, and caused France to seek compensation
in other parts of Africa.
This strategic and diplomatic explanation of the Scramble was
subsequently somewhat refined by D.K. Fieldhouse, most notably in his
Economics and Empire.15 While agreeing with Robinson and Gallagher that
political causes were uppermost, Fieldhouse recognised that there were
economic interests at stake in what he termed 'the imperialism of trade1.
But like them, he argued that the causes of the Partition were located in
Africa, in the periphery itself. Taken together, Fieldhouse, Gallagher, and
Robinson succeeded in combining anti-Marxist prejudice with the appearance
of Africanist agency. At pains to separate out political from economic
causes, *I,ey defined imperialism politically, and explained it peripherally.
'Europe was pulled into imperialism1, concluded Fieldhouse, 'by the magnetic
force of the periphery'.*"
For all its enduring popularity with conservative scholarship, however,
important aspects of this 'excentric'*' version of Africa's colonial subjugation
have been substantially modified in the course of the last two decades.
Undoubtedly the most telling criticisms which have been made of Africa
and the Victorians, and of Economics and Empire, were Newbury and
Kanya-Forstner's convincing demonstration that the 'crucial change in French
African policy occurred not in 1882-3 lin Egyptl ..., but in 1879-80 lin
Senegal I; * 8 Platt's vigorous re-statement of the specificity of the 'New
Imperialism1 in the context of the economic forces transforming Europe
and North America in the latter third of the nineteenth century; *^  Hopkins'
illuminating explanation of West Africa's partition 'in terms of a crisis of
adaptation to the new economy made manifest in the long commercial
depression which began in the 1870s, and in the conflicts which followed
the intensified search for profits and revenue';20 and the point forcefully
made by Barraclough, and latterly by Law, that the distinction drawn by
Robinson and Gallagher, and especially by Fieldhouse, between political
and economic factors was an unreal one.2* 'The era of imperialism and
the Scramble for Africa was precisely that in which relations between the
state structure and capitalist business were becoming closer, as belief in
laissez-faire gave way to acceptance of the legitimacy and necessity of
state power to manage economic affairs', comments Law. 'This development
... can be seen in the revival of protectionism as well as in the increasing
readiness to use political means to solve economic difficulties in Africa;
its effect ... is to make the cherished distinction between "politics" and
"economics" ... ultimately inapplicable1.22
The sum of these individual criticisms is formidable. Yet while their
combined impact seemingly goes a considerable way towards meeting Law's
contention that the basis for an alternative theory of imperial expansion
'showing the interconnexions among the multitude of detailed events and
developments already exists," neither his own explanation, briefly sketched
in the pages of the Journal of African History, nor the more elaborate
accounts recently advanced by Boahen2* and by Sanderson," are entirely
satisfactory. While Law firmly locates the Scramble in a world context
'where the diffusion of industrialization outside Britain was creating severe
competition in existing markets and fears that productive capacity was
outgrowing available demand,2** his emphasis on the role played by Britain's
increasingly uncompetitive industrial sector may be misplaced. Similarly,
Boahen's claim that the 'New Imperialism1 can be seen 'primarily in terms
of the intensification of competition between the principal industrial states
for a share of the world's markets ... landl as an almost hysterical reaction
to the crisis in industrial capitalism1,2? i6 difficult to maintain in the face
of an expanding body of literature which challenges much of the conventional
wisdom concerning the nature of Britain's industrial revolution. These
revisionist accounts,2" which stress the pivotal position occupied by the
City of London, as well as the uneven and often highly regionalised growth
of the 'first industrial nation', have already enabled Cain and Hopkins, for
example, to cast a quite different light on the entire process of British
expansion overseas.*•*
Although several summaries of existing explanations have been
published in the last ten years or so,^° the only other 'covering hypothesis'31
for the Scramble as a whole is the one which Sanderson initially sketched
in the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History and subsequently
developed in volume six of the Cambridge History of Africa. His explanation
turns on partition .
as the consequence of the collapse of an almost exclusive
British hegemony, at a time when both Britain and other
powers were beginning to see significant economic
advantage in the extension and consolidation of their
formal or informal control over African territory ...
However, emphasis on the "background" of growing
economic interest does not imply that all annexationist
decisions were somehow, "in the last analysis",
economically motivated. On the contrary. The collapse
of British hegemony created a very complex and
fluctuating pattern of conflicts and alignments in both
Africa and Europe. Amid this complexity, policy-makers
often simply could not afford to handle African questions
by giving economic interests absolute priority over
the demands of diplomacy and strategy, or even of
prestige.32
But even this erudite interpretation has been criticsed for its 'apparent
circularity1. 'Sanderson's case1, argues Hopkins, 'amounts to the claim that
partition was a result of the destabilised political situation arising out of
the decline of the military and political power which supported the Pax
Britannica. The difficulty is not that this argument is untrue, but that it
is a truism. It redefines the problem, but does not carry the discussion much
further forward1." ^
How, then, can discussion be taken beyond the range of obstacles
identified by Hopkins and other scnolars?34 This paper will suggest that
one possible way forward ties in paying close attention both to the pattern
and consequences of capitalism's uneven development during the last third
of the nineteenth century, particularly the City of London's crucial role
in mediating the development of a world economic system; and to the various
forms in which capital penetrated Africa, especially merchant capital in
West Africa, and industrial capital in Southern Africa. It takes as its starting
point Norman Etherington's salutory reminder that theories of imperialism
are 'not theories of empire ... There are no general theories of colonial
expansion. There is no special Marxist theory of colonialism ... land I there
are no "mono-causal" explanations'.35
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'The major fact about the nineteenth century', Eric Hobsbawm has
remarked, 'is the creation of a single global economy, progressively reaching
into the most remote corners of the world, an increasingly dense web of
economic transactions, communications, and movements of goods, money
and people linking the developed countries with each other and with the
undeveloped world'.^6 Of particular importance for the purposes of this
paper was the further fact that the pace and nature of change accelerated
in the last 30-40 years of the century. This period, according to Barraclough,
transformed itself to such an extent that 'the age of coal and iron was
succeeded after 1870 by the age of steel and electricity, of oil and
chemicals'.3*7 Industrial capital's accelerated development, sometimes called
the 'Second Industrial Revolution', more precisely identified as the
transitionary phase between competitive and monopoly capitalism, was
quintessentially an uneven process. It profoundly upset existing economic
and social balances both between countries, and within them. Generally
speaking, the new industries were most in evidence in Germany and the
United States of America. By 1900, these two countries had carved out
an increasing share of world trade for themselves, largely at Britain's expense.
Britain's relative industrial decline after c.1870 was influenced not
only by increased competition from other countries, however, but also by
the fact that her own process of industrialisation had been extremely uneven.
Most research in the last decade or so stresses that the rise of industry in
Britain was a more protracted process than had previously been believed;
and that by the middle of the nineteenth century, but especially after 1870,
the hegemony of commercial and financial interests centred on the City
of London had been consolidated.'" Leaving aside the vexed question of
the extent to which Britain's loss of industrial dynamism 'derived from the
historic disjunction between City and industry',^ the fundamental point
is that manufacturing and industrial interests played second fiddle to
commercial and financial concerns. Consequently, from the 1870s onwards,
'while Britain's dominance of international finance increased, her industrial
sector began to decline relative to her major competitors. Free trade and
invisible exports, the twin supports of financial supremacy, played their
part in emphasizing and underwriting the decline of industry1.4^
This industrial decline was all the more serious because it occurred
in the context of what contemporaries called the 'Great Depression' of 1873
to 1890. Once again, the effects of this Depression were not uniformly
felt, but while there were periods of recovery, the general tendency of prices
was downwards. In this deflationary situation, increased competition for
markets sent a wave of protectionism sweeping across Europe and North
America between 1875 and 1892. Only Britain remained committed to Free
Trade. It did so not because of any sentimental attachment to past practice
when Britain had been the 'workshop of the world', but because the operations
of the City depended on the unfettered movement of capital and commodities.
As a result, British industry, already disadvantaged, according to some
scholars, by a basic distortion in British capital markets, was denied protection
on its home ground. British imports of manufactured goods increased from
three per cent of total imports in 1860 to 25 per cent by 1900. Nor were
British manufacturers able to compete in the markets of advanced industrial
countries. Excluded by the often better quality of German and American
products, as well as by tariff barriers, British exports to Europe and the
United States fell by 19 per cent in'value between 1875 and 1900. For all
of these reasons, 'industrial interests in Britain shifted, around 1880, into
decisive support for the acquisition of new markete in Asia and Africa'.4*
But neither the shifting balance of economic and political power
in the northern hemisphere nor intensified competition for markets during
the Depression of themselves determined that Africa would be partitioned.
Processes and events in Africa itself were equally crucial. Although the
roots of Africa's involvement in the wider world economy stretched back
to antiquity, the nature and impact of its most important commercial networks
changed in the first half of the nineteenth century with the transition from
the slave trade to trade In vegetable oils. Hopkins particularly has argued
that whereas the trade in slaves had been very largely, the prerogative of
West Africa's indigenous ruling elites, so-called 'legitimate commerce1 in
vegetable oils gradually expanded to incorporate small farmers and tradere.
Elite power and wealth previously based on slaves and the slave trade found
it increasingly difficult to accommodate these new forms of accumulation.
In very general terms, so Hopkins concluded, West Africa'6 aristocracy
experienced an economic and political crisis during this period.4^ It was
10
a crisis which essentially arose from the spread of commodity relations.
Merchant capital, by providing a market and encouraging people to produce
on a regular basis for it, had an unsettling effect, economically and socially,
wherever it established itself. It tended to loosen existing social ties and
relations, even though it did not transform them.4^ Ruling classes who
earlier had concentrated wealth in their own hands, found their position
weakening in relation to small producers who now dealt directly with coastal
merchants or their middlemen. This was the case in Senegal and in several
Oil River city states, for example, where established rulers were challenged
by new producers and traders.44
West Africa's political and social instability, already manifest by
mid-century, was greatly aggravated after 1870 by a dramatic fall in the
price of vegetable oils. Prices fell not only because the. opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869 provided Southern Asian producers with easier access to
European markets, but also because of expanding world production of mineral
oils.45 The ensuing trade depression quickly made itself felt through
intensified internal rivalries, as disputes raged over 'the allocation of shares
in the export trade, over the prices to be asked and given, and over the
distribution of reduced profits'.46 These rivalries in turn were accentuated
by European merchants, as they were drawn into local African politics,
particularly in their role as creditors.47 And increasingly, all of these tensions
and struggles adversely affected the flow of trade. To take three examples
only: in 1879 the number of trading caravans reaching Sierra Leone dropped
by four-fifths as a result of inland warfare. In the 1880s commercial
operations in the Gold Coast interior were hindered by the instability of
the Ashante Confederacy; and during much the same period the supply of
vegetable oils was occasionally deliberately held up by the Yoruba in attempts
to force coastal merchants to pay higher prices.4**
In these circumstances, some European traders began calling upon
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their respective Governments to restore 'law and order". The smooth operation
of trade, they argued, depended on political stability. They were joined
by others whose falling profit margins made them want to restructure the
market, so as to eliminate African middlemen." Wherever possible,
competition was reduced through amalgamation and minimised by monopoly,
'Merchants do not make their profits by revolutionising production but by
controlling markets', Kay has noted. 'Thus merchants capital ... never
embraced the advantages of competition but strived to form monopolies
wherever it could ... It eschewed the principles of laissez-faire and sought
state support for monopolistic privileges'.^ The introduction in the 1850s
of regular steamship lines between Europe and West Africa had already
added to the problems facing established merchants by lowering freight
rates and making it easier for newcomers to enter the trade, and when
competition further intensified during the Depression, the interruptions
to the regular flow of trade caused by the dissolution of indigenous West
African economy and society, were the last straw. European merchants
began demanding 'political action up to and including colonial annexation,
as a means of checking or suppressing commercial competition and, by
reducing the political independence of African middlemen, forcing them
to accept lower prices'.^
The 'character, intensity and influence of mercantile pressures' for
metropolitan intervention not only varied from locality to locality in West
Africa itself,52 but also met with very different responses from the
Governments of France, Britain and Germany. Of all the major powers
trading in West Africa, France was least able to absorb the new competitive
strains. Because the convergence of merchant demands with the broader
impact of the Depression was particularly marked in France, her merchant
lobby received a sympathetic hearing from successive administrations."
Indeed, when the slump deepened after 1875, Paris toyed with the idea of
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large-scale state expenditure on railway development between Algeria and
Senegal in order 'to pull the French economy out of depression1.54 Named
after the then Minister of Public Works and soon-to-be Prime Minister,
this Freycinet Plan apparently envisaged U6ing these regions 'as a springboard
for the creation of an empire in North and West Africa which would perform
the role for the French economy which India was assuming for the British
economy - as a market for such capital goods as railway materials and,
through the provision of cheaper transport, for such consumer goods as
textiles' .5 5
Although the more grandiose elements of the scheme were hastily
dropped when disaster overtook an Algerian expeditionary force, and the
French economy made a recovery of sorts in 1880-1, thinking of this kind
helped ensure that merchant requests for less dramatic forms of intervention
were acted upon.5** In any case, key sections of French civil society, including
the Army still smarting from its humiliation in the Franco-Prussian War,
were increasingly willing to countenance military campaigns.5? And with
Europe and North America's technological lead over the rest of the world
widening almost daily, wars of colonial conquest promised to be cheap and
easy. 'By 1870 the local |West Africanl deterrents to penetration were no
longer serious ...', Flint has noted.
Quinine, first used systematically by Baikie, the surgeon
in command of the Niger expeditions of the late 1850s,
proved its effectiveness as a prophylactic against malaria.
The steamship was immune to tsetse fly, and the explorers
had mapped the main navigable waterways by 1860.
Railways with steam locomotives could be built where
no navigable rivers would serve.5°
What steamers and quinine prophylaxis made feasible, the 'gun revolution'
rendered almost certain.59 The rapid development of breech loading rifles,
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soon with magazines and repeating mechanisms, and ultimately of machine
guns, decisively tilted the military balance in favour of Europe. From the
1880s onwards, 'colonial battles in Africa became increasingly lopsided',
reaching their apogee at Omdurman in 1898 where, in,the words of its most
famous participant, 'within the space of five hours the strongest and
best-armed savage army yet arrayed against a modern European Power
had been destroyed and dispersed, with hardly any difficulty, comparatively
6mall risk, and insignificant loss to the victors'.60
Starting from their existing Senegalese enclave in 1879, the French
began to advance across the western Sudan. The details of this forward
movement and of subsequent French expansion generally in the course of
the 1880s and 1890s are not the concern of this paper, beyond noting that
once French expeditions penetrated beyond the immediate hinterland of
vegetable oil-producing regions, 'the impact of deflationary forces on external
commerce cannot be held responsible for European annexations everywhere
in West Africa1.**! in j t s latter stages, the French scramble for African
territory, even if accelerated by Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882,62
and justified, like its British and German counterparts, in terms of Social
Darwinism,6^ was primarily sustained by 'renewed industrial depression
and heightened tariff barriers Iwhichl generated a French will to claim any
domain which could be brought within the tariff system of the French
empire1.6* 'At a time when France is trying to increase her volume of business
with Senegal, to develop the resources of her colony and to create new outlets
in the very centre of Africa, it does not seem to me possible that all this
effort should be made for the profit of foreign industry', commented the
colony's governor. '... In such a country the theory of free trade cannot
be put into practice.'65
By contrast to French policy, Britain's initial response to the clamour
of her own merchants for intervention in West Africa was cautious and
conservative. Although Britain's trading interests were by far the largest
of any European state involved in West Africa, merchant cries for help were
largely ignored. Once France began swallowing large chunks of West Africa,
however, this raised the spectre of British trade being excluded by high
tariff barriers from a widening zone of French territory.66 As a result,
British policy began to change direction. At first, merchant capital had
to shift for itself in the form of George Goldie's monopolistic United African
Company formed in 1879, but thereafter Whitehall gradually bestirred itself.
Towards the end of 1883 'the policy of establishing protectorates for the
Niger and Oil Rivers was .endorsed by the Cabinet, "with a view to the
maintenance of an unfettered trade, which unhappily is not favoured by
the arrangements of the French in those latitudes"1.6? Fifteen months later
Britain secured international recognition of her interests on the Niger River,
and soon afterwards the United African Company was transformed by charter
into the Royal Niger Company. In 1887 Britain took action against local
rulers who obstructed commercial operations in the Delta, but 'it was not
until 1893 that the Niger Coast Protectorate was established with a formal
administrative system to meet the growing needs for effective government
in an area of expanding British trade'.68
This slow and reluctant change of policy precisely reflected the limited
importance of both merchant and industrial capital in contemporary British
political economy. Their interests were often important enough to cause
London to react to external changes, but they were rarely sufficiently
powerful to initiate policy. Government policy, crucially influenced by
the financial and service interests of the City of London, remained committed
to Free Trade.6^ In this context, and recognising that there was no realistic
possibility of Free trade policies being jettisoned in favour of Protection,
industrial interests in Britain added their voice to merchant demands for
state intervention. Businessmen, according to Cain, 'began to take an interest
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in anticipatory annexation of overseas markets. The main fear was that
large areas of the world might otherwise be occupied by rival powers with
protectionist inclinations1.70 Seen in this light, 'far from being inconsistent
with free trade, intervention in semi-civilized regions was regarded as an
anti-cyclical measure for the restoration of commercial prosperity by a
widening of the free trade area'.71 Whereas France embarked on colonial
expansion in order to erect tariff barriers around as large an empire as
possible, Britain expanded her colonial possessions in order to keep as large
an area as possible free of tariff barriers. 'Protectorates are unwelcome
burdens', wrote one senior member of the Foreign Office, 'but in this case
it is ... a question between British protectorates, which would be unwelcome,
and French protectorates, which would be fatal. Protectorates, of one sort
or another, are the inevitable outcome of the situation1.72
Britain's pronounced reluctance during the 1880s to do anything more
than was strictly necessary to safeguard her existing commercial interests,
was exemplified further south in West-Central and East Africa. In neither
region were significant British interests involved. As in West Africa, markets
in these two regions became much more competitive in the last third of
the nineteenth century, but at the same time there were important differences
between them and the West African littoral. In the first place, merchant
capital in West-Central and East Africa was much less important than in
West-Africa; and secondly, their export trade was more diversified, including
• cloves from Zanzibar and ivory and wild rubber from the coastal hinterlands.'-1
Here the significant point is that although the price of vegetable oils collapsed
after 1870, the price of cloves remained stable, and the prices of rubber
and ivory actually increased in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
They ran counter to the general trend of the Depression.74 Two very general
conclusions can be drawn from all of this: the smaller volume of trade meant
that although commodity relations were spreading, they were not doing
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so at a pace and on a scale likely to generate the economic and political
tensions manifest in West Africa; and the rising price of rubber and ivory
more than offset the falling price of vegetable oils. Consequently, as Munro
has observed,
deflationary pressures on trade and profits were less
acute in West-Central and Eastern Africa and European
merchants at the coast had less reason to be dissatisfied
with commercial conditions. The forces seeking to
change the status quo came less from the ranks of
established mercantile groups, and more from among
interloping figures who saw in the relative commercial
vitality of these regions a potential for the creation
of commercial empires.'*
Chief among the interlopers attracted to West Central Africa was
Leopold II of Belgium. Obsessed with the idea of controlling what he hoped
would be the riches of the Congo Basin, Leopold actively promoted European
exploration of Central Africa during the second half of the 1870s.76 In
East Africa, Leopold's counterparts were Karl Peters, founder of the German
Society for Colonization, and William MacKinnon, a British shipowner whose
vessels plied between Aden and Zanzibar. MacKinnon had earlier wanted
to lease the Sultan of Zanzibar's mainland territories in order to develop
interior trade, but this particular scheme was blocked in 1877 when the
British Government opted for the continued exercise of indirect influence
through the local potentate.'' The ensuing uneasy equilibrium was disturbed
at the start of the 1880s when Leopold's efforts to make commercial treaties
with local rulers along the Lower Congo ran up against the activities of
the French explorer, Savorgnan de Brazza. When France ratified de Brazza's
treaties in 1882, this set off alarm bells in Whitehall and the Wilhelmstrasse.
Both Britain and Germany feared that the protectionist French intended
to carve out another huge colony for themselves in Central Africa, but because
neither country had vital economic interests at stake, they were unwilling
to make pre-emptive annexations to keep France out. For broadly similar
reasons, they would have preferred the vast area which later became the
Congo Free State left open to everyone's trade. MThel ... main interest
of Britain was that the Congo should be free to the peaceful enterprise of
all the world', Hyam and Martin have written. 'Basically, Britain had enough
to do and wished the Congo to lie fallow.'78
Until this point, Germany had remained aloof from the intensifying
scramble for colonies. The very different structure of German industry
and trade meant that Germany was subject to nothing like the same degree
of competitive squeeze as were Britain and France during the Depression.
For all that North German merchants were firmly rooted along the West
African coast, their complaints about the threat posed by French annexations
initially fell on deaf ears in Berlin. Bismarck at first ignored demands for
an active colonial policy.7^ Then, quite abruptly, German policy changed.
Between early 1884 and the first few months of 1885, Germany declared
protectorates over Togoland, the Cameroons, South West Africa, and German
East Africa. Most historians now agree that Bismarck joined the race for
colonies because he found it expedient to defuse domestic political and class
tensions by encouraging overseas expansion.8** fThe policy of colonial
annexation as a diversion in domestic policy1, Stoecker has concluded, 'was
for Bismarck only a tactical method tried for a time and not a permanent
system.'81
That Germany did not join the Scramble primarily for economic reasons,
was underlined soon afterwards by its attitude during the Berlin West Africa
Conference. Alarmed by the mounting intensity of the scramble for pieces
of Africa, and keen to take advantage of Anglo-French antagonism following
the breakdown of negotiations over Egypt's future in August-September
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1884,82 Bismarck called a conference of all the concerned European powers,
as well as the United States of America. Meeting between November 1884
and February 1885, the conference laid down ground rules for the future
annexation of African territory. Among its achievements, the conference
recognised British interests and rights along the River Niger, but most
importantly of all it recognised the sovereign existence of Leopold's Congo
Free State.°^ It did so not least because Leopold played his cards with
consummate skill. He won French backing by promising them right of first
refusal 'should the International Association of the Congo dispose of its
territory1, while France, well aware that Britain would block any forward
move on its part, 'raised no objection, confident that Leopold's enterprise
would soon collapse'.*" And by committing the Association to Free Trade,
Leopold also secured German and British support. In November 1884, with
domestic politics now sufficiently under control for him to ignore once again
calls for colonial expansion, Bismarck extended German recognition to the
Association's flag. Britain reluctantly followed suit. Obliged by German
hostility to abandon its support for Portuguese claims in the region, Whitehall
acquiesced once the Congo Free Trade Area was guaranteed.85 in East
Africa, where no such guarantees obtained in the aftermath of Germany's
unexpected seizure of Tanganyika, Britain belatedly unleashed MacKinnon.
In 1888 his Imperial British East Africa Company was chartered. It rapidly
established a presence of sorts in Kenya and Uganda, but in 1894 went
bankrupt, forcing Britain to take over its responsibilities.^
Not long after MacKinnon had begun operations, a royal charter was
also granted to another company. This was the much more formidable British
South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes, the activities of which are best
understood in the context of the mineral discoveries which transformed
Southern Africa in the generation after 1870. While Britain had been pulled
into the interior 'on the coattails of expansionary forces inherent in Cape
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colonial society' before that date, none of them came close to matching
the expansive dynamic generated by the Mining Revolution.8'' The discovery
of diamonds near Kimberley at the end of the 1860s, and especially of gold
on the Rand in 1886, caused enormous and unprecedented demands for capital
and labour. By contrast to West Africa where merchant capital took its
profits in markets supplied mostly by peasants, the profitable mining of
gold and diamonds depended crucially on the productive investment of
industrial capital and the creation of a black working class. And the
realisation of these imperatives led directly, and often violently, to a new
and revolutionary economic social and political order throughout the
sub-continent.
Britain's interests in the new mineral discoveries were substantial
from the start, and grew considerably thereafter. Sufficiently attracted
by the diamond fields of Griqualand West to contemplate South African
confederation in the 1870s,88 Britain was irresistably drawn to the huge
gold deposits of the Transvaal. In the first place, as Marks and Trapido
have pointed out, Britain's position as 'the centre of the world's money market
depended ... on Iherl unique financial institutions, and on an international
trading currency - sterling - whose importance was assured by the
preparedness of British banking institutions to defend it with gold'.89 No
less importantly, 'British investors supplied between 60 and 80 per cent of
foreign investment in the Rand by 1899; and economic growth centred on
the Transvaal provided a rich and rapidly growing market for British goods1.90
British capital alone totalled c.£60 million, and Southern Africa's trade,
worth some £52,200,000 in 1897, accounted for 'nearly three-quarters of
the total external commerce of Africa south of the Sahara1.91 Yet even
as Southern Africa came to play an increasingly significant part in British
overseas trade and investment, the very magnitude of the gold discoveries
in the South African Republic seemingly posed a threat to British strategic
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and economic concerns in the region. These latter interests, write Cain
and Hopkins, 'were threatened by German and French investment, which
raised the possibility that the Transvaal might be taken out of the British
orbit, and by Kruger's modernization policy, which increased mining costs
at a time when the leading firms needed to attract and invest substantial
capital1.^
When the regional centre of gravity had first shown signs of shifting
from Cape Town to Pretoria after the discovery of the main reef on the
Rand, British policy had become progressively more solicitous of Cape colonial
aspirations. Embodied in the cumbersome form of Rhodes, where they were
further combined with the interests of De Beers, as well as those of his
Consolidated Gold Fields which had been left on the fringes of the first
Rand boom, these aspirations were never simply 'local!, however.^ In the
specific context of the late 1880s they became increasingly intertwined
with imperial policy, once Rhodes and successive British Governments
discovered their mutual interest in finding another goldfield to counterbalance
the Rand. As the gaze of fortune hunters and imperial adventurers alike
fell on the reputed Land of Ophir north of the Limpopo, an area which had
previously only been an object of fitful imperial and missionary concern,
was suddenly transformed into one of compelling fascination.94
At the beginning of 1888, Lobengula of the Ndebele was persuaded
to sign a treaty making his country a sphere of British influence. But by
this stage of the Scramble, spheres of influence were not enough. The Berlin
West Africa Conference had stressed 'effective occupation1. Nor were Rhodes
and the British the only foreigners interested in the region. The Portuguese
were as well. Although Portugal was virtually a British colony for much
of the nineteenth century, from the late 1850s a small national bourgeoisie
had attempted to loosen the ties of Portuguese dependency on Britain. One
projected way of doing so was to establish closed or protected colonial markets
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for Portuguese industry, but partly because of British pressure, and to some
extent because Portugal's bourgeoisie itself was divided over the issue, the
programme was never implemented.^* According to Clarence-Smith, though,
it was speedily resuscitated once the severity of the Depression became
apparent. A further spur to action occurred in 1885 when Portugal's claims
to the Congo were ignored, at least partly because effective occupation
could not be proved. In the course of the next year or so, Portugal succeeded
in winning international recognition of Angola's southern and northern
boundaries, and began laying the foundations for a Central African empire
which would stretch between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Expeditions
were sent into the interior of Mozambique. When they began pushing onto
the highveld of Mashonaland, however, disaster intervened. In 1886 a
Portuguese force was defeated by the Shona of the Mtoko district/3? It
was a set-back which proved fatal to Portuguese aspirations. By the time
they were ready to try again, British interest in the region had grown beyond
recognition.
With Imperial backing, Rhodes and his well-connected associates
had won .a mineral concession from Lobengula. This concession was used
as the basis for the granting of a Royal Charter in 188^ *, which empowered
the British South Africa Company to 'make treaties and promulgate laws,
as well as to maintain a policy force and undertake public works'.^ j n short,
Rhodes was authorised to establish a company state. No northern limit
was set on the sphere of the British South Africa Company's operations,
and with one eye fixed on the need to secure labour supplies for the future,
Rhodes agreed to subsidize the cost of extending British protection to Scottish
missionary interests settled around Lake Nyasa (Malawi). In 1891 Portugal
was warned not to encroach on these interests. Agents were also despatched
beyond the Zambezi, and although Leopold beat them to copper-rich Katanga
(Shaba), they nonetheless secured paper rights over much of what subsequently
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became Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). But for all this, most of Rhodes' energy
was actually spent on organising an invasion force to occupy Mashonaland,
and it was this so-called 'pioneer column1 which set out in June 1890 hoping
to make its own and its backers1 fortunes. When three years of frantic
scouring failed to uncover rich gold deposits amongst the Shona, the Chartered
Company wasted no time in provoking war with Lobengula. Once again,
though, Rhodes was disappointed. Prospectors could find nothing remotely
comparable to the Rand in the newly-conquered Matabeleland. And when
mining engineers in much the same period began proving that the Transvaal's
goldf ields went far deeper .than anyone had previously suspected, it became
clear that the real 'second Rand1 lay not across the Limpopo but in the deep
levels of the Rand itself.95
At the end of 1895, every attempt at counter-balancing the wealth
of the Transvaal by means of northern expansion having come to naught,
Rhodes launched the Jameson Raid against Kruger's republic. To the great
discomfort of the British Foreign Secretary who had been kept fairly well
informed of Rhodes' intentions, the Raid was a dismal failure.100 By January
1896 its surviving members were languishing in Pretoria Prison. The same
year, close to the other end of Africa, another colonial invasion force also
suffered defeat. At the Battle of Adowa in March 1896, an Italian army
was defeated by Ethiopian forces.101 But while the Ethiopians were left
to enjoy the fruits of their victory for another 40 years, the British were
much more impatient. The commercial and financial imperatives of the
City of London, and those of mining capital, were immeasurably stronger
than the forces propelling Italian colonialism. Although the Kruger
Government's labour accord with the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique,
and its Industrial Commission in 1897, went a long way towards meeting
the grievances of the goldmining industry, its continued policy of granting
monopoly concessions in order to promote local industrial growth, greatly
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aggravated the highly sensitive cost structure of the deep level mines.
The antipathy felt towards the Kruger state by the most important sections
of the gold mining industry found regular expression in the local press, where
capital's demands for reform merged with those of Whitehall.l0^ Determined
to uphold British and Cape interests against the Transvaal's renewed
protectionism after 1895,*04
 an (j a n x i o u s t o maintain the weekly arrival
of South African gold bars which provided the Bank of England with an
important safety net,*05 London pressed hard for the extension of the
franchise to the white 'uitlander' population and the installation of a friendly
regime in Pretoria.10^ Yet none of this necessarily meant war, until push
became shove under the combined impetus of British public opinion and
military miscalculations on both sides.*07 In 1899 the South African War
began. South of the Sahara, the partition of Africa was complete.
m
This paper's interpretation of the Scramble locates its dynamic squarely
in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe, but also attempts to pay
due regard to changing conditions in the periphery contingent on the manner
of capital's penetration of Africa itself. Africa was partitioned, then, because
of capitalism's markedly uneven development after c.1870. This unevenness
manifested itself both between countries and within social formations.
Concretely expressed, the changing balance of economic power between
the advanced industrial nations caused the weakest of them, France, and
to a lesser extent, Britain, to embark on programmes of colonial expansion.
British intervention, however, invariably reactive and reluctant, was crucially
shaped by City interests encapsulated in the policy of Free Trade.
Intervention occurred first in West Africa where a lengthy process of
conservation-dissolution initiated by merchant capital slid into instability
as export prices collapsed. Stabilisation of merchant capital accumulation
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required the imposition of colonial rule. 'In uncivilised countries', remarked
Sir George Goldie, 'there can be no permanence of commerce without political
power',108 Once underway, this process rapidly expanded to cover We6t
Central and East Africa where annexation more often than not turned on
the question of tariff barriers. And above all, Britain's need to protect its
global role in world commerce while retaining unencumbered access to the
continent's biggest market, played a decisive role along with the revolutionary
imperatives of mining capital in bringing the Scramble to a spectacularly
bloody and extremely expensive finale. In this 6ense, It might be 6aid that
the partition of Africa wa.s less a gigantic footnote to the Indian empire
than it was to the City of London.
I R Phimister
University of Cape Town
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